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The Rhetorical Devices of the Keepers of State Secrets

Stéphane Lefebvre1

Abstract
This article examines a set of rhetorical devices forming a linguistic practice
that are used repeatedly by secret keepers in the United States and the
United Kingdom when legally and popularly arguing against the disclosure of
state secrets. Each of these devices (using lists, using the future conditional,
arguing from ignorance and authority, arguing from consequences, and
arguing by analogy) play a role in shaping our social understanding of state
secrecy. More importantly, these devices provide secret keepers a means by
which to assert their knowledge and expertise, and to legitimize, if judges
agree with them, the nondisclosure of state secrets. Once they have been
created and have become commonly known to secret keepers, and validated
by the judiciary through court precedents, they can be reproduced and
passed on from a generation to the next. This article documents the use of
these devices and their interrelationships.
Keywords
analogy, arguments, consequences, discourse, harm, ignorance, knowledge,
listing, rhetorical devices, secrecy, state secrets, temporality

“You can’t handle the truth! . . .
You have the luxury of not knowing what I know! . . .
My existence, while grotesque and
incomprehensible to you, saves lives!”
Colonel Nathan R. Jessup (Jack Nicholson) in the movie A Few Good Men.i
1
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“What Do Judges Say on the Protection of Intelligence Secrets?” Intelligence and National
Security 34 (2019): 62-77. The views expressed herein are his own and do not reflect the
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This article examines a set of rhetorical devices used by American and
British secret keepers to legally and popularly argue against the disclosure of
state secrets. Here, I use the terms “secret keepers” to refer to state
officials who are formally entrusted with classified information and legally
bound to prevent their unauthorized disclosures, and “state secrets” to refer
to information that is classified by the state’s classifying authorities.ii
Secrecy, of course, concerns the concealment of information and material
the contents or substance of which would cause harm if revealed to anyone
not entrusted with their safekeeping.iii
The devices under review - the use of lists, temporal expressions,
arguing from ignorance and authority, consequences, and analogy collectively play a role in shaping our social understanding of state secrecy.iv
Secret keepers use these devices as a linguistic practice to appeal to logic
and rationality, emotion, ethics (in the sense of establishing credibility in the
eyes of one’s audience), and time in order to convince their audiences,
judges, and the public that they are correct in opposing the disclosure of
state secrets.v Rhetorical devices are validated by judicial decisions and
precedents so they can be reproduced and passed on from one generation of
secret keepers to the next.vi As key components of the secret keepers’
discourse on state secrecy, they help present a reality that is expressed
through usage regularities.
https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/secrecyandsociety/vol2/iss2/6
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Taken together as a linguistic practice producing authoritative
meaning, rhetorical devices, as the samples I selected for this article show,
have by design a truth production component about the effects of disclosing
state secrets and a prescriptive component about what to do with them.
They are also not easily disentangled. Too often, two or more devices are
used together in the same utterance as a coherent construct. Looking at
them individually should help readers to better understand how the practice
works.
Up to this point, the literature on secrecy has shown that secrecy in all
its forms is pervasive in society and constitutive of the material nature of
state power. In a post-9/11 context, claims of state secrecy have been
increasingly normalized, and its breaches have produced a large amount of
research material. The claims that the state make to justify the nondisclosure of state secrets and punish those who disclose them are generally
accepted by most scholars and other observers as essential to the proper
functioning of democracies. As such, there is agreement with the secret
keepers of the state that a certain amount of secrecy can be justified; where
that threshold is, of course, is subject to intense debates in both the
literature and the courts. Yet, the sets of reasons or rationalities that secret
keepers use to justify the non-disclosure of state secrets remains
understudied, especially where it matters most: the legal environment. It is
a prime site for such an investigation and what follows because it is there
that these reasons are best articulated, especially in opinions (United States)
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and judgments (United Kingdom). I supplement this large collection of legal
texts with other genres such as the media, memoirs, and official documents
because together that they reveal “recurrent linguistic behaviour.” vii Without
knowing how state secrecy claims are justified through discourse, no counter
discourse can be properly articulated and deployed.
This article thus makes two contributions to the literature. First, it
offers a novel way to understand the reasons offered by secret keepers to
prevent the disclosure of state secrets. By focusing on how secret keepers
use particular rhetorical devices as forms of persuasion, it highlights the
social nature of secrecy, and offers one explanation of the workings of state
secrecy with respect to a disciplinary field that, in the words of Urban, “has
remained disappointingly general, universalistic, and largely divorced from
social and historical context.”viii As “practices of classification powerfully
shape the boundaries of public knowledge,” critical attention to the
production and reproduction of state secrecy is, I would suggest,
warranted.ix Second, it contributes to the study of discourse by
characterizing the use of rhetorical devices by particular agents (secret
keepers) in relation to a particular discourse (state secrecy) in both a
primary site (law) and genre (legal documents). In doing so, it lays out the
groundwork for the view that the ubiquity of rhetorical devices are useful to
secret keepers in persuading others to make sense of the social world of
state secrecy the same way they do.
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Using Lists
Listing is an ancient linguistic expression.x By omitting distracting
details, and by bringing together a set of reasons that justifies the
nondisclosure of state secrets, lists provide a way to describe a particular
aspect of the social world of state secrecy.xi The lists developed by secret
keepers conform to the defining characters of lists that Jayyusi lays out in
Categorization and the Moral Order.xii First, the items have a relationship to
each other; that is, they are all reasons used to justify the nondisclosure of
state secrets. Second, the lists have a purpose, which is instrumental as
they are meant to persuade judges and the public that secret keepers are
justified in safeguarding state secrets from disclosure. Third, the reasons
listed are not totally interchangeable for other purposes; they can be
differentiated for the purpose of protecting state secrets. Finally, the lists are
adequate in the sense that they meet the stated purpose of their existence,
which is to prevent the disclosure of state secrets.
The reasons stated on the lists were selected by state officials to be
seen as standing together, and as such, there is a high degree of
consistency across lists. Read together, these reasons give the impression of
totality (what else could go wrong, one would ask?) and of a complexity that
would be difficult to reduce to simple and direct cause-to-effect relationships
because the possibilities that harm would follow the disclosure of state
secrets are essentially limitless.xiii

Published by SJSU ScholarWorks, 2021

5

Secrecy and Society, Vol. 2, No. 2 [2021], Art. 6
The lists differ slightly from country to country, as one would
reasonably expect, but resemble one another in scope and possibilities of
harm. They regularly make reference to sets of reasons that include: the
need to protect the identity of intelligence personnel and human sources, the
need to protect methods by which state secrets were obtained, the need to
protect intelligence relationships with foreign entities, the need to protect
the effectiveness of security agencies, and the need to protect seemingly
innocuous information from negative exploitation by adversaries of the state
such as spies, terrorists, or criminals.
Here are three examples of such lists, one from the United States and
two from the United Kingdomxiv:
Example 1. A lawyer who worked for the George W. Bush
administration provided this list in testimony before the US Congress:
Leaks of national security information can compromise all
aspects of our national security program. They can compromise
specific national security operations, as happened in 2006 with
the disclosure of the Treasury Department’s secret program for
tracking terrorist finances. They can compromise human
sources, as apparently happened when it was recently reported
that a Saudi source had helped to foil al Qaeda’s recent airplane
bombing plot. And keep in mind that whenever a source’s
identity or existence is leaked, it not only negates the
effectiveness of that particular source, it also undermines our
ability to develop and cultivate sources in the future.
Leaks can also compromise our methods, as apparently
happened with the recent disclosure of our alleged use of
malware to attack the Iranian nuclear weapons program. They
can certainly endanger our government personnel, like the CIA
chief of station who was publicly outed and then killed by
terrorists in Athens in the 1970’s [sic]. And, importantly, they
can weaken our alliances, those operational relationships
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between us and foreign services that are so vital to our national
security operations around the world.
Finally, it’s worth noting that government employees with
clearances give a personal promise that they will protect the
government’s classified information. The integrity of public
service is diminished whenever that promise is broken. xv
Example 2. In the context of inquest proceedings during which a
coroner asked for evidence in the hands of the Security Service (MI5) and
the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), the Secretary of State signed a Public
Interest Immunity (PII) certificate in which she listed the following reasons
against disclosure:
10. The reason why disclosure of the documents in Bundle A
would bring about a real risk as described is that those
documents include national security information of one or more
of the following kinds:
a) information relating to operations and capabilities of the
security forces, law enforcement agencies and security and
intelligence agencies, disclosure of which would reduce or risk
reducing the effectiveness of those operations or of other
operations either current or future;
b) information relating to the identity, appearance, deployment
or training of current and former members of the security
forces, law enforcement agencies and security and intelligence
agencies, disclosure of which would endanger or risk
endangering them or other individuals or would impair or risk
impairing their ability to operate effectively or their ability to
recruit and retain staff in the future;
c) information received in confidence by the security forces, law
enforcement agencies and security and intelligence agencies
from foreign liaison sources, disclosure of which would
jeopardise or risk jeopardising the provision of such information
in the future;
d) other information likely to be of use to those of interest to the
security forces, law enforcement agencies and security and
intelligence agencies in pursuit of their functions, including
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terrorists and other criminals, disclosure of which would impair
or risk impairing the security forces, laws enforcement agencies
and security and intelligence agencies in their performance of
their functions.
11. It is not possible for me to be more specific in this certificate
about the particular information in Bundle A, or the precise harm
that its disclosure risks causing, since my doing so would be
liable to risk causing the very damage that the certificate seeks
to avoid.xvi
Example 3. This list was included in a certificate to the court by the
Secretary of State:
4.1. Secrecy is essential to the work of the Security Service.
Many individuals who cooperate with the Service - such as
agents - only do so under guarantee of complete confidentiality
and anonymity. If their identity became known not only would it
jeopardise the work in hand and their future co-operation but
also it would put them at personal risk. Such a risk is not
fanciful, as a large part of the Security Service’s work comprises
the investigation of terrorists. Clearly, the same risks apply to
members of the Security Service itself.
4.2. Secrecy is also essential because the Security Service
undertakes investigations covertly. The Service’s effectiveness
lies in its ability to obtain and exploit secret intelligence, which
those under investigation may go to some lengths to keep
hidden. As well as the use of agents mentioned above, sources
of secret intelligence include: a. the interception of
communications, b. eavesdropping, and c. surveillance. Clearly,
such techniques lose much if not all of their effectiveness if it is
known when and how they are used.xvii
In each of these examples, it would very difficult for anyone to
thoroughly assess the validity of the claims put forward due to their lack of
specificity.xviii Ultimately, these lists tell us little. They simply state the types
of disclosure that, in the view of secret keepers, would be injurious to
national security. They do not explain, beyond generalities, why the release
of a particular kind of secrets would be injurious in a particular case; that is,
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readers must assume a cause-to-effect relationship that is not directly
demonstrated.
These lists are characterized by their use of plain English, including the
absence of multiple negatives and complex legal terminology, and
abundantly use conditional terms such as if and would, and verbs associated
with harm, such as jeopardize, endanger, risk, weaken, lose, and
compromise. The order by which the reasons are listed is not important, as
each reason can find itself just about anywhere on a list. But as they stand
together, they exhibit cumulativity, display a sense of finality, and
completeness. To anyone unfamiliar with the social world of state secrecy,
the effect of listing may be overwhelming: how could so many reasons be
rebutted? With so much harm at stake, are these reasons not only necessary
but sufficient? If harm can and would result from the disclosures of state
secrets that should remain undisclosed, is mitigation even possible? The
significant and overwhelming use of anticipated future harm in these lists is
directly interrelated to the temporality aspect brought to the fore by secret
keepers, which I now turn to.
Using the Future Conditionalxix
Secret keepers, grounded in human existence, are clearly conscious of
time and its implications.xx In arguing for the protection of secrets, they
offer a particular sense of time that frames our understanding of the
anticipated effects of disclosures.xxi These effects are based on past
experiences that are known to secret keepers, and “used to explain
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(foresee) the future,” a future that has no delimitations, which is built out of
instances of anticipation.xxii These instances are also the product of their
behavior in their daily lives, what they take for granted, the routines they
follow without thinking about them, and the common sense knowledge they
use in protecting state secrets from disclosure.xxiii Secret keepers acquire
this habitus through socialization, or social conditioning, and reproduce it
throughout their careers.xxiv As Hoy notes, “[t]he bodily habitus incorporates
dispositions that are then projected as expectations for the future.” xxv
The use of the future conditional by secret keepers is eschatological.xxvi
Harm could happen tomorrow, a long time from now, and mitigation is
assumed to be impossible. Secret keepers do not differentiate with respect
to when or where the harm resulting from the disclosure of state secrets
they believe should remain undisclosed could occur.xxvii But by generally
invoking an indefinite dimension of time, secret keepers exclude other
“equally plausible understandings of temporality”xxviii such as the notion that
“secrecy does not necessarily need to persist for lengthy periods of time and
certainly not in perpetuity.”xxix
The form the device takes is classic: if P [the release of state secrets],
then Q [harm will ensue], which in turn implies that if not-P, then not-Q,
embedded in subjunctive conditional sentences with the consequent having
“would” or “could” as its principal operator.xxx As we will see in the next
section, the grounds for accepting these conditionals lie in the experience
and expertise of the secret keepers.
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In addition to the temporal effect explicit in the lists established by
secret keepers, a similar temporal effect can be seen in arguments made by
secret keepers to protect very specific information from disclosure. This
includes information pertaining to the identity of human sources providing
information to the state, the identity of certain state officials, the identity of
individuals under investigation, the sources and methods used by security
agencies to gather intelligence or conduct particular activities, reports
produced from the intelligence collected, and the existence, nature,and
extent of intelligence liaison relationships with partner countries. The first,
lengthy, example is typical of those found in US affidavits submitted to the
courts.xxxi
In a lawsuit launched against Ishmael Jones (a pen name), the author
of The Human Factor: Inside the CIA’s Dysfunctional Intelligence Culture,
CIA presented commonly used reasons for keeping his identity, and by
extension, of any other CIA officers, a state secret. First, the CIA argued
that if the identity of its officers were known, they would not be able “to
effectively and securely collect foreign intelligence and conduct clandestine
foreign intelligence activities around the world […].”xxxii Second, CIA
emphasized that if the identity of its officers were known, “foreign
governments, enterprising journalists, and amateur spy-hunters would be
able to reconstruct” their travels and where they lived, possibly causing
anger, embarrassment, or hostility against the United States in other
countries. Actions these countries could take include “limiting joint
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endeavors, reducing intelligence sharing, deferring negotiations on matters
of importance to the United States, or demanding that CIA officers known or
declared to the foreign government leave the country.xxxiii Third, by knowing
the identity of CIA officers as well as where and when they lived abroad,
other countries “foreign governments; enterprising journalists, and amateur
spy-hunters would be able to unearth and publicly disclose the cover
methods,” CIA officers used to conceal their true status as CIA officer, and in
so doing prevent the CIA from using these methods in future and putting
publicly unknown officers operating undercover at risk of discovery.xxxiv
These shorter US-focused examples further illustrate how temporality
is typically articulated:
Example 1: “Exposing a covert officer’s ties to the CIA could jeopardize
the physical safety of past, present, and prospective human sources.”xxxv
Example 2: “[…] if the CIA released the information related to foreign
governments, those government may be less willing and able to assist the
CIA in the future - and the CIA’s breach of trust may affect the willingness of
potential future sources or entities to assist the CIA. Additionally, if the CIA
disclosed particular activities, sources, or methods, they would become less
effective and their continued use by the CIA would be jeopardized.”xxxvi
Example 3: “This information would tend to reveal, among other
things, whether or not the CIA has been granted the authority to engage in
drone strikes, what role the Agency plays (if any) in the execution of drone
strikes - especially in comparison to other agencies, and/or the amount of

https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/secrecyandsociety/vol2/iss2/6
DOI: 10.31979/2377-6188.2021.020206

12

Lefebvre: The Rhetorical Devices of the Keepers of State Secrets
resources it devotes to this area. The unauthorized disclosure of this
information reasonably could be expected to harm the national security of
the United States […].”xxxvii
Example 4: “Moreover, courts give the utmost deference to the
Executive Branch’s ‘predictive judgment’ in evaluating both the risk that
disclosure might pose to national security and the ‘acceptable margin of
error in assessing’ that risk because of the Executive’s superior position to
make such determinations.”xxxviii
In the United Kingdom, similar arguments are encountered. For
example, a former British Intelligence & Security Coordinator spoke in no
uncertain terms about the future harm to the very existence of intelligence
agencies that would result if their secret techniques and sources were
disclosed:
I understand the argument that the reason the Security and
Intelligence Agencies are obsessed with secrecy is because they
want to avoid accountability. But as former Intelligence &
Security Coordinator and Agency Head I know it to be wrong.
Intelligence organisations that cannot protect their techniques
and sources will not survive for long. Compromise them and
they will dry up and we will be less safe.xxxix
Secret keepers, of course, usually do not shy away from admitting to
the courts that such underspecified and undifferentiated temporal impact is
on par with the course: “The articulation of threatened harm in the future
always will be somewhat speculative and a showing of actual harm is
unnecessary.”xl In the following example, which dates to the presidency of
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John F. Kennedy, future harm is highly speculative due to the age of the
documents in question:
The name of a clandestine human intelligence source classified
as secret was withheld from a JFK document. […]. Even today,
such a disclosure would provide foreign intelligence services with
valuable insights into the CIA’s activities, sources, and methods.
Moreover, the disclosure of the source’s identity also could
endanger the source and his or her family and associates and
subject them to reprisals, even if the source is deceased. […]
With regard to intelligence sources and methods, as was
recognized in Sims, 471 US at 175, the “forced disclosure [by
the courts] of the identities of its intelligence sources could well
have a devastating impact on the Agency’s ability to carry out its
mission.”xli
Secret keepers certainly know that history is giving them reasons to be
worried when the names of intelligence officers and sources are disclosed
without authorization, either through leakage or espionage.xlii In her
testimony before Congress, then CIA case officer Valerie Plame Wilson,
whose cover had been blown by a White House staffer and the Deputy
Secretary of State, succinctly made reference to that knowledge while
stressing the gravity of exposing the identity of undercover CIA officers xliii:
The CIA goes to great lengths to protect all of its employees,
providing at significant taxpayers’ expense painstakingly devised
and creative "covers" for its most sensitive staffers. The harm
that is done when a CIA cover is blown is grave but I cannot
provide details beyond this in a public hearing. But the concept
is obvious. Not only have breaches of national security
endangered CIA officers, it has jeopardized and even destroyed
entire networks of foreign agents who, in turn risked their own
lives and those of their families - to provide the United States
with needed intelligence. Lives are literally at stake.xliv
Plame's comment on the difficulty of providing concrete examples or
details in a public hearing is common in the United States as it is in the
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United Kingdom.xlv This limits the amount of material available for analysis,
but, more importantly, it shapes the discourse of secret keepers in such a
way that the harm they argue would ensue in cases of disclosures is framed
as speculative, that is, usually weakly supported by facts, and focused
instead on potential risks. Hence, “would” and “could” predominate in the
language at play. As Tetlock has aptly noted, a term like “could” is
ambiguous by definition:
When you ask research subjects what “could” means, it depends
enormously on the context: “we could be struck by an asteroid
in the next 25 seconds,” which people might interpret as
something like a .0000001 probability, or “this really could
happen,” which people might interpret as a .6 or .7 probability.
It depends a lot on the context. Pundits have been able to
insulate themselves from accountability for accuracy by relying
on vague verbiage. They can often be wrong, but never in
error.xlvi
The most interesting aspect of the temporal reasoning put forward by
secret keepers is the implicit notion that their access to privileged knowledge
of what has happened in the past gives them authority and legitimacy in
assessing what would likely happen if state secrets are disclosed. In other
words, it is from the understanding of their respective domain of knowledge
that secret keepers derive their predictions. This is essentially an intertwined
argument from both ignorance and authority, to which I now turn.
Arguing from Ignorance and Authority
The argument from ignorance assumes that because we do not know
that something is false, then it is true. Secret keepers use this rhetorical
device to argue that the disclosure of state secrets would lead to yet
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unknown but highly anticipated risks.xlvii Their argument conforms to the
traditional structure: 1. Secret keepers do not know for sure, and may have
no indications whatsoever, that harm would result from the disclosure of
state secrets. 2. The consequences of disclosing state secrets, however,
could be catastrophic (among the possible harms, lives could be lost). 3.
Therefore, secret keepers and judges should not disclose state secrets in
order to prevent harm.xlviii The effectiveness of this rhetorical device is
compounded by the additional argument that, in the absence of convincing
evidence, secret keepers are best positioned, given their expertise and
experience, their access to secrets and the magnitude of risks, to determine
the likelihood of harm resulting from the disclosure of state secrets (an
argument from authority).xlix The CIA best expressed it in a defense motion:
“Only the nation’s intelligence community has a complete picture of which
disclosures pose a danger to national security.”l As Hoeken, Timmers and
Schellens note, “[t]he argument from authority can support claims about the
desirability of a consequence by stating that the claim is in accordance with
the opinion of an expert in this field.”li The reasoning employed by secret
keepers is thus one of deductive competence (here an “extra logical factor
that modifies the interpretation of premises” 1 to 3).lii
These arguments have the effect of closing dialogue and debate as
there is no one to seriously engage with.liii Often, these arguments are used
bluntly. In this British example, the Home Department told the Information
Tribunal that “the [Security] Service was best placed, through its experience
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and expertise, to make the relevant decisions.”liv In this civil case example,
the CIA argued that the assessment of harm is properly located with the
Agency:
Indeed, given that “the assessment of harm to intelligence
sources, methods and operations is entrusted to the Director of
Central Intelligence,” […] plaintiff cannot credibly purport that
his own judgment about the consequences of disclosure in this
case is superior to that of Acting DCI [Director of Central
Intelligence] McLaughlin.lv
This argument has been repeated over and over again, often in the
exact same language of superiority. But as the DC Circuit made clear, there
is nothing wrong with this practice of using “the same or similar language in
different affidavits supporting FOIA [Freedom of Information Act]
exemptions” because, “when the potential harm to national security in
different cases is the same, it makes sense that the agency’s stated reasons
for nondisclosure will be the same.”lvi In its more detailed expression, a US
assistant attorney general asserts the argument in the following manner,
making ample use of precedents:
[…] judicial deference [to the executive] is rooted in three wellestablished principles. First, the primacy of the Executive Branch
in matters of national security and foreign relations is enshrined
in the Constitution and in judicial precedent […]. Accordingly,
courts have recognized that the Executive Branch’s ability to
maintain secrecy is essential. See Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,
299 US at 320. Moreover, the Executive Branch’s familiarity with
matters of foreign relations and national security means that it
has accumulated an expertise on the impact of the disclosure of
particular classified information. [….].
Second, in contrast to the Executive Branch’s experience, courts
have recognized that judges are in no position to second-guess
the national security and foreign relations concerns articulated
by the Executive Branch. […] (“Judges, moreover, lack the
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expertise necessary to second-guess such agency opinions in
the typical national security FOIA case.”; […]
Third, judicial deference to executive classification decisions is
especially important because of the severity of the consequences
that may result from the disclosure of classified information. “It
is ‘obvious and unarguable’ that no governmental interest is
more compelling than the security of the Nation.” […].lvii
The following, shorter and US-focused, examples similarly embrace the
argument from ignorance and the argument from authority:
Example 1: “Courts normally will defer to the expert opinion of the
agency, because Courts ‘lack the expertise necessary to second-guess such
agency opinions in the typical national security FOIA case.’ […].”lviii
Example 2: “[…] it is important to note that the information sought by
Plaintiffs directly ‘implicat[es] national security, a uniquely executive
purview.’ […] courts […] defer to an agency’s determination in the national
security context, acknowledging that ‘the executive ha[s] unique insights
into what adverse affects might occur as a result of public disclosure of a
particular classified record.’ […]. Courts have specifically recognized the
‘propriety of deference to the executive in the context of FOIA claims which
implicate national security’.”lix
Example 3: “It is well-established that the Judiciary gives the utmost
deference to the Executive Branch’s classification decisions, including the
Executive’s assessment of the national security risk of disclosing classified
information.”lx
Example 4: “Indeed, the Supreme Court has cautioned that
‘weigh[ing] the variety of complex and subtle factors in determining whether
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disclosure of information may lead to an unacceptable risk of compromising’
national security is a task best left to the Executive Branch. […](‘[T]he
judiciary is in an extremely poor position to second-guess the executive’s
judgment in [the] area of national security.’); […] (‘Judges * * * lack the
expertise necessary to second-guess * * * agency opinions in the typical
national security FOIA case.’).”lxi
Example 5: “Recognizing that national security is a uniquely executive
purview, courts typically defer to such an agency determination. […]. (‘Few
judges have the skill or experience to weigh the repercussions of disclosure
of intelligence information.’); […] (‘Judges . . . lack the expertise necessary
to second-guess [] agency opinions in the typical national security FOIA
case’). Thus, the Court should defer here to Mr. Bradley’s and Ms. Janosek’s
assessments of the likely repercussions to the national security from
disclosure of the information withheld pursuant to exemption (b)(1).” lxii
Examples of the use of the argument from ignorance and the
argument from authority abounds in US legal documents prepared by secret
keepers (affidavits) and their government attorneys (motions, etc.). While
less frequent, it also appears in other jurisdictions. Counsels for the
executive in the United Kingdom’s have used the argument as effectively.
One notable example has seen the counsel for the Secretary of State for the
Home Department arguing to the presiding judge, using precedents just like
his counterparts do in the United States, that the executive was, because of
its experience and expertise,lxiii

Published by SJSU ScholarWorks, 2021

19

Secrecy and Society, Vol. 2, No. 2 [2021], Art. 6
in the best position to judge what national security requires, and
the correct approach in law is to entrust decision of this sort to
them: Rehman v SSHD [2001] 3 WLR 877. Mr Tam also referred
to us the decision of Mr Justice David in Ewing (20 December
2002 unreported).lxiv
Secret keepers have extended the argument of ignorance and the
argument from authority to actors beyond the judiciary. Former British
Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, for example, accused the Guardian newspaper
of showing “extraordinary naivety and arrogance” for publishing intelligence
documents leaked by Edward Snowden, a former US National Security
Agency contractor. He told the BBC:
They’re blinding themselves about the consequence and also
showing an extraordinary naivety and arrogance in implying that
they are in a position to judge whether or not particular secrets
which they have published are not likely to damage the national
interest, and they’re not in any position at all to do that.lxv
Snowden, a former secret keeper, has also been criticized for not
having the knowledge and expertise to make the decision to leak classified
documents. His Booz Allen Hamilton supervisor at the National Security
Agency in Hawaii made that argument:
He never actually had access to any of that data. All of the
domestic-collection stuff that he revealed, he never had access
to that. So he didn’t understand the oversight and compliance,
he didn’t understand the rules for handling it, and he didn’t
understand the processing of it... In my mind Ed’s not a hero.lxvi
The argument from ignorance and the argument from authority are
compelling, especially when secret keepers can show it has legitimacy
through judicial precedents. It is also compelling because they are framed
around the notion of national security, which unarguably is a duty of the
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executive; governments regularly assert in courts that their first duty is to
protect the security of their citizens from foreign and domestic threats.
Arguing from Consequences
Arguing from consequences is a common form of argumentation
drawing on causal reasoning. It requires that allegedly foreseeable
consequences be cited in response to a proposed action, which would
determine whether it is pursued or not. These consequences can of course
either be positive or negative.lxvii When arguing from consequences, secret
keepers stress negative consequences using a language of fear to illustrate
the harm the disclosure of state secrets would cause. In doing so, they seek
the arousal of emotions that would rally their listeners to their point of view
by fostering empathy for potential victims of harm.lxviii Secret keepers take it
as evident that harm would ensue if state secrets were disclosed. In making
this assertion, they portray a belief that no one would be so insensitive to
the possibility of a fellow human being seriously harmed to support the
release of state secrets. As it happens, there is scientific support behind that
belief:
results from studies within persuasion research suggest that
people are more sensitive to differences in desirability [such as
that no one be harmed from the disclosure of state secrets] than
to differences in likelihood [that such harm would actually
occur].lxix
Their argument from consequences has two intertwined prongs. One
directly links the protection of state secrets to national security, and the
other to matters of life and death. National security is instinctively

Published by SJSU ScholarWorks, 2021

21

Secrecy and Society, Vol. 2, No. 2 [2021], Art. 6
understood by most citizens: it is the state that protects them from external
and internal threats that could cause them grave harm. So when the state
invokes national security on the basis of knowledge that only it possesses,
citizens are expected to defer to its authority and sense of duty: after all, it
is in their interest to do so if they want to be secure in their person and
property.lxx By incorporating threats of harm to real individuals or to the
effectiveness of national security agencies into their discourse and using
value-oriented lexical terms, secret keepers appeal to fear of consequences
should these threats materialize, and as such continue to engage in a
legitimizing exercise that started on the basis of their competence and
authority.lxxi
In this section, I present examples in which secret keepers directly link
foreseeable consequences to matters of life and death, using their extralegal reactions to the major leaks of Chelsea Manning and Edward
Snowden.lxxii I also present examples highlighting the foreseeable
consequences of leaking state secrets for the secret keepers themselves,
their sources and methods, and for the efficiency of the national security
system, and ultimately its ability to keep both secret keepers and citizens
safe. There is an obvious overlap between these consequences as they are
often used together.

Protecting Lives
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Governments traditionally and regularly asserts that their first duty is
to protect the security of its citizens from foreign and domestic threats.lxxiii
Secret keepers take that duty seriously and from time to time have
reminded themselves that unauthorized disclosures of state secrets
endanger lives. As Richard Moberly noted,
after the raid that killed Osama bin Laden […in 2011], Leon
Panetta, then the Director of the CIA, sent a memo to CIA
employees stating, “Disclosure of classified information to
anyone not cleared for it—reporters, friends, colleagues in the
private sector or other agencies, former Agency officers—does
tremendous damage to our work. At worst, leaks endanger
lives.”lxxiv [emphasis added]
Secret keepers have seized the unauthorized disclosures of state
secrets by Private Bradley (now Chelsea) Manning and Edward Snowden to
highlight the serious harm both have arguably caused to the national
security of the United States and to the lives of particular individuals. They
characterize Manning’s unauthorized disclosures of the Afghan and Iraqi war
logs (records of ongoing significant military and insurgent activities) in
criminal terms, indeed a monstrous crime committed against the national
security of the United States. Given that Manning was formally charged and
tried and subsequently convicted, this immediately became a dominant
narrative in mainstream media.lxxv
When Wikileaks released the Afghan war logs (over 91,000 battlefield
reports, most of them secret) in July 2010, the response of the US
government highlighted possible losses of lives. White House spokesperson
Robert Gibbs said that the release of the logs “has a potential to be very

Published by SJSU ScholarWorks, 2021

23

Secrecy and Society, Vol. 2, No. 2 [2021], Art. 6
harmful” to US and allied military forces engaged in the fight in Afghanistan,
and that it “poses a very real and potential threat to those that are working
hard every day to keep us safe.”lxxvi Gibbs was supported by Secretary of
Defense Robert Gates, who said that Wikileaks was “morally guilty for
putting lives at risk.”lxxvii In a released statement, the Obama administration
said that the leaks of the Afghan war logs “could put the lives of Americans
and our partners at risk, and threaten our national security.”lxxviii As the
argument went, the leaked documents contained the names of Afghans
nationals who had collaborated with the United States.lxxix This meant, said
Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, that
Wikileaks’ Julian Assange and his source [Manning] “might already have on
their hands the blood of some young [US] soldier or that of an Afghan
family.”lxxx Zahibullah Mujahid, a spokesperson for the Taliban, certainly
gave ammunition to Mullen when he was quoted as saying the Taliban were
indeed looking at the logs in the search for Afghan informants:
We knew about the spies and people who collaborate with US
forces. We will investigate through our own secret service
whether the people mentioned are really spies working for the
US If they are US spies, then we know how to punish them.lxxxi
Two weeks after the Afghan war logs were released, a Pentagon
spokesperson acknowledged that as of that date no one in Afghanistan had
been harmed as a direct result of the unauthorized disclosure, but that it
could only be a matter of time [a play on temporality] because “there is in
all likelihood a lag between exposure of these documents and jeopardy in
the field.”lxxxii
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The reactions of secret keepers to the unauthorized leak of the Iraqi
war logs (391,832 battlefield reports) in October 2010 were similar to the
release of the Afghan war logs a few months earlier. For example, Pentagon
spokesman Geoff Morell stressed the illegal aspect of the disclosure and the
fact that the logs were now in the hands of America enemies. As the Taliban
claimed to have done with the Afghan war logs, Morell pointed out that the
Iraq war logs could be mined as well, thus risking the lives of American and
allied soldiers deployed in Iraq; “this security breach,” he said, “could very
well get our troops and those they are fighting with killed.”lxxxiii
With respect to the 251,287 US State Department diplomatic cables
that Manning leaked to Wikileaks, approximately 130,000 were unclassified,
100,000 CONFIDENTIAL, 15,000 SECRET, and none TOP SECRETlxxxiv;
Manning Harold Koh, the US State Department legal adviser, said to
Wikileaks’ Julian Assange that his organization obtained the cables illegally
and their release “would place at risk the lives of countless individuals” and
endanger the ability of the US government to conduct its business in a
cooperative manner with other states, including with respect to life and
death matters such as terrorism, pandemic diseases and nuclear
proliferation.lxxxv
The Snowden leaks were of a different kind than Manning’s. The
documents concerned signals intelligence gathered by the United States
National Security Agency (NSA) and allied services for surveillance purposes
that Snowden did not agree philosophically with, such as the collection of
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metadata on American citizens ostensibly to catch terrorists.lxxxvi Most of the
leaked documents were of a highly technical nature and difficult for anyone
not well versed in intelligence matters to decipher. Because Snowden
purported to reveal abuses of authority and highlight issues he believed are
matters of general public interest, he received support from an eclectic
range of people. Inevitably, secret keepers were Snowden's harshest critics,
due to high sensitivity of the documents and classification at the TOP
SECRET level. At the time of his leaks, Snowden himself was a secret keeper
sworn to uphold his oath of secrecy and loyalty to the United States. He was
an insider who, in the eyes of secret keepers, betrayed all. Yet, Snowden
had set limits on what he would and would not disclose. He had no intent,
for instance, to endanger anyone’s life, such as a CIA human asset: “Most of
the secrets the CIA has are about people, not machines and systems, so I
didn’t feel comfortable with disclosures that I thought could endanger
anyone.”lxxxvii
Fully aware as a secret keeper that unauthorized disclosures could
cause harm, Snowden was decidedly vocal in expressing concerns for
possible harm to others and wanting to avoid any harmful outcomes.
Snowden claimed to have vetted every document he leaked to ensure they
would not cause harm to national security or any individuals.lxxxviii Yet, just
like Manning, he was accused of being a source of great harm. Former CIA
Director R. James Woolsey, Jr. bluntly repeated to the media that Snowden
“has blood on his hands.”lxxxix However, at no time did Snowden expose the
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identity of US intelligence officers operating covertly in violation of the
Intelligence Identities Protection Act.xc
The British government was likewise concerned about the possible
consequences of the leaks and went as far as issuing a Defence (D) Advisory
Notice (D Notice) to editors, warning them to self-censor their coverage of
Snowden’s leaks so as not to “jeopardise both national security and possibly
UK personnel.”xci A few weeks later, after David Miranda, an associate and
the spouse of Guardian journalist Glenn Greenwald who had extensively
written on the leaks, was detained while transiting London’s Heathrow
airport on his way to Brazil from Germany. Home Secretary Theresa May
responded to criticism by directly associating the documents leaked by
Snowden with possible harm to peoples’ lives:
I think it is right, given that it is the first duty of the government
to protect the public, that if the police believe somebody has in
their possession highly sensitive stolen information which could
help terrorists which could lead to a loss of lives then it is right
that the police act. That is what the law enables them to do.xcii
May was backed by Scotland Yard, who, after taking a look into the
contents of Miranda’s computer, that its contents were “highly sensitive,”
and “could put lives at risk” if made public.xciii At a subsequent Divisional
Court hearing, Oliver Robbins, UK’s Deputy National Security Adviser, stated
that Miranda’s computer’s hard drive had approximately 58,000 highly
classified documents, some with information on British intelligence officers;
the unauthorized disclosure “would result in a risk to the lives of them and
their families and the risk their becoming recruitment targets for terrorists
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and hostile spy agencies.”xciv Nick Clegg, the Deputy Prime Minister, similarly
justified the destruction by the Government Communications Headquarters
(GCHQ) of the Guardian computers containing documents leaked to the
newspaper by Snowden:
I believed at the time, and still do, that it was entirely
reasonable for the government to seek to get leaked documents
back or have them destroyed. Along with the information the
Guardian had published, it had information that put national
security and lives at risk. It was right for us to want that
information destroyed.xcv
Snowden’s unauthorized disclosures led secret keepers to argue that
they could cause harm to the lives of many individuals. The latter fall into
two categories: officials formerly or currently employed by intelligence
agencies and whose names appear on leaked documents, and the population
at large, whose protection is now diminished by terrorists now knowing how
to avoid being tracked, monitored and surveilled. John Naughton well
captured how the discourse surrounding Snowden’s leaks went:
“Kafkaesque” seems more appropriate to the situation in which
we find ourselves. The conversation between the state and the
citizen has been reduced [that] goes like this.
State: Although intrusive surveillance does infringe a few
liberties, it’s necessary if you are to be protected from terrible
things.
Citizen (anxiously): What terrible things?
State: Can’t tell you, I’m afraid, but believe us they are truly
terrible. And, by the way, surveillance has already prevented
some terrible things.
Citizen: Such as?
State: Sorry, can’t go into details about those either.
Citizen: So how do I know that this surveillance racket isn’t just
bureaucratic empire building?
State: You don’t need to worry about that because it’s all done
under legal authority.
Citizen: So how does that work?
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State: Regrettably, we can’t go into details because if we did so
then the bad guys might get some ideas.xcvi
Protecting the Effectiveness of Intelligence Agencies
Protecting the identity of intelligence officers, in particular those
deployed abroad for the purpose of gathering intelligence, is of paramount
importance to secret keepers. Then President George W. Bush confirmed this
assertion in a speech to Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employees in
1999, stating bluntly that those who leak the identity of intelligence
operatives are the “most insidious of traitors.”xcvii In a lawsuit launched
against one of its former employees,xcviii the CIA presented commonly used
reasons for keeping his identity (and by extension, of any other CIA officers)
a state secret. First, it argued that if the identity of its officers were known,
they would not be able “to effectively and securely collect foreign intelligence
and conduct clandestine foreign intelligence activities around the world
[...].”xcix Second, it emphasized that if the identity of its officers were known,
“foreign governments, enterprising journalists, and amateur spy-hunters
would be able to reconstruct” their travels and where they lived, possibly
causing anger, embarrassment or hostility against the United States in other
countries. Actions these countries could take include “limiting joint
endeavors, reducing intelligence sharing, deferring negotiations on matters
of importance to the United States, or demanding that CIA officers known or
declared to the foreign government leave the country.c Third, by knowing
the identity of CIA officers as well as where and when they lived abroad,
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other countries “foreign governments; enterprising journalists, and amateur
spy-hunters would be able to unearth and publicly disclose the cover
methods” CIA officers used to conceal their true status as CIA officer, and in
so doing prevent the CIA from using these methods in future and putting
publicly unknown officers operating undercover at risk of discovery.ci
What the CIA described in the Jones' case might actually have
happened a few years before, although no firm evidence surfaced publicly.
In her testimony before Congress, former CIA case officer Valerie Plame
Wilson, whose cover had been blown by a White House staffer I. Lewis Libby
and the Deputy Secretary of State,cii succinctly made reference to these
arguments while stressing the gravity of exposing the identity of undercover
CIA officers:
The CIA goes to great lengths to protect all of its employees,
providing at significant taxpayers’ expense painstakingly devised
and creative ‘covers’ for its most sensitive staffers. The harm
that is done when a CIA cover is blown is grave but I cannot
provide details beyond this in a public hearing. But the concept
is obvious. Not only have breaches of national security
endangered CIA officers, it has jeopardized and even destroyed
entire networks of foreign agents who, in turn risked their own
lives and those of their families - to provide the United States
with needed intelligence. Lives are literally at stake.ciii
During the trial for perjury of I. Lewis Libby, CIA officer Craig Schmall
testified in a language very similar to that used by Plame. In answering a
question from the prosecutor, Schmall said that
now that Valerie Wilson’s name is out in the press, foreign
intelligence services in countries where she served now have the
opportunity to investigate everyone she came in contact [with]
while she was in those countries. And, in many countries, those
people, innocent or otherwise, can be harassed along with their
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families. They can lose their jobs. They can be arrested, tortured
or killed. So in my mind, it was a very grave danger involved.civ
As Plame stressed, the unauthorized disclosure of the identity of an
intelligence officer who has recruited or obtained information from human
sources can potentially be as damaging as revealing the identity of the
sources themselves. Ishmael Jones explained it thus:
I have dealt with hundreds of people in countries such as Russia,
Ukraine, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Libya. Those who provided
secrets to the United States, especially on terrorist
organizations, nuclear weapons programs, and organized crime,
are at risk once my identity and association with the CIA
become known. Revealing my identity and thus the connection
of these people can result in their arrest and/or execution. Many
of the people I have dealt with had no espionage role, such as
hotel clerks, visa providers, and social and cover company
business contacts, but they too will be suspected of espionage
and can be arrested, harassed, and/or executed.cv
In order to be effective and fulfill their mandate, security agencies not
only rely on their own employees but also on a variety of other human
sources and employ many methods.cvi The identity of human sources and
the exact ways and means by which intelligence is collected are among the
most highly guarded secrets of the state. As former CIA Director and then
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said, “[g]rowing up in the intelligence
business, protecting your sources is sacrosanct.”cvii Former senior FBI officer
Andrew McCabe said as much when he wrote:
In the FBI, a confidential informant is someone who regularly
provides information to the FBI but whose role as a source can
never be revealed. Exposing the informant’s relationship with
the FBI could place the source and his or her family in great
danger. Protecting the identity of a confidential informant is one
of an agent’s most sacred responsibilities.cviii
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Sources and methods are legally protected and any attempt at
disclosure is strongly contested in the United Kingdom and the United
States. Heads of state and senior officials have regularly stressed the
necessity of their protection. US President Bill Clinton was unequivocal about
this:
I agree that unauthorized disclosures can be extraordinarily
harmful to United States national security interests and that far
too many such disclosures occur. I have been particularly
concerned about their potential effects on the sometimes
irreplaceable intelligence sources and methods on which we rely
to acquire accurate and timely information I need in order to
make the most appropriate decisions on matters of national
security.cix
So was David Omand, who served as the highest levels of Britain’s
intelligence system:
I understand the argument that the reason the Security and
Intelligence Agencies are obsessed with secrecy is because they
want to avoid accountability. But as former Intelligence &
Security Coordinator and Agency Head I know it to be wrong.
Intelligence organisations that cannot protect their techniques
and sources will not survive for long. Compromise them and
they will dry up and we will be less safe.cx
Human intelligence sources providing information to security agencies
are always at risk of discovery.cxi In the case of foreign human intelligence
sources, their own government, if aware of their identities and activities, can
be a source of danger to “themselves, their families, and their associates.” cxii
Therefore, before they give information to a security agency or another
country human intelligence sources will need assurances that their identity
and activities will be protected from public disclosure. If such assurances
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cannot be given, or unauthorized disclosures occur, the security agencies
relying on these sources would lose credibility and encounter increasing
difficulties in recruiting and retaining new sources.cxiii As a former
intelligence officer told Congress of his experience at the time of the Church
Committee in the 1970s:
Colonel ALLARD. […]. Ma’am, I was a young intelligence officer
in Germany during the Church Committee hearings back in the
1970’s [sic]. I had sources look at me and say, you know what,
I am not going to do that for you because I don’t want to see
my name on the front page of The New York Times or
Washington Post. I now know how they felt. And let me tell you
something. When you have that reluctance of sources to believe
in the confidence of the United States, that is a huge blow. It
takes years to overcome this.cxiv
As then Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Stephen R
Kappes, explained:
For example, if an unauthorized disclosure of classified CIA
information regarding a human intelligence source were made,
that disclosure could jeopardize the source. If the CIA were to
officially acknowledge the information, however, that additional
step could further jeopardize the source and could deter other
clandestine human intelligence sources from cooperating with
the CIA. Existing and future human intelligence sources would
note that the CIA was willing to confirm publicly a clandestine
human intelligence source’s involvement with the CIA. These
human sources would factor that additional risk into their own
decision on whether to provide information to the CIA and could
decide that the risks are too great to cooperate with the CIA.cxv
The situation is the same with respect to domestic as foreign sources.
As former senior FBI officer Andrew McCabe explains:
Not giving up your people: This is important. It is crucially
important not only to the FBI but to the country’s safety and
security. The ability to identify and develop relationships with
human sources is oxygen to the FBI. The Bureau cannot live
without that. It is the first step toward the activation of any of
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our other, more sophisticated investigative authorities. You do
not get to search warrants, you don’t get to subpoenas, you
don’t get to listen in on a subject’s communications through a
FISA [Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act] or Title III court
order, without people telling you what they know. And if you
can’t credibly tell them that you will protect and conceal their
identity if they are willing to go out on a limb, if they are willing
to risk their own and their families’ lives and welfare—if they
can’t trust that you will protect them—then they will not
cooperate with you.cxvi
The protection of human sources is taken so seriously as necessitating
that alleged criminals not be confronted with state secrets as evidence. As
David Anderson, Britain’s independent reviewer of terrorism legislation,
stated in such a situation in 2013, had British prosecutors used key evidence
that was classified and in the hands of intelligence agencies against
terrorism suspects, it would have endangered the human sources from
whom the evidence originated:
The reasons why these people [terrorism suspects] weren’t
prosecuted - or were prosecuted without reference to all the
intelligence - was more about a reluctance to use human source
reporting in an open criminal trial for fear of compromising or
even endangering a source.cxvii
In addition to protecting its human sources, the United States has
stubbornly fought any disclosure that could help its adversary figuring out its
capabilities.cxviii One post-9/11 example is the detention sites operated by
the CIA in foreign countries. Conscious that information concerning the
existence of these sites would eventually come out in public, as it did, CIA
warned of the implications for the continuous use of that method of
gathering intelligence. In an internal memorandum, CIA officials explained
that:
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As captured terrorists may be held days, months, or years, the
likelihood of exposure will grow over time [...]. Media exposure
could inflame public opinion against a host government and the
US, thereby threatening the continued operation of the
facility.cxix
Later learning that the media had information about a detainee being in a
specific country, the CIA preventively shut down that country’s detention
site.cxx After leaks on detention sites occurred anyhow, another country
asked that the CIA detention center on its territory be closed within hours.cxxi
There are many pre-9/11 examples of methods being compromised.
For example, Robert Hanssen, the FBI special agent who spied against the
United States for the Soviet Committee on State Security (KGB) and its
successor, the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), revealed the
existence of a tunnel beneath the Soviet Embassy in Washington, DC used to
listen to Soviet communications. The damage of this disclosure was
significant:
Hanssen told the Soviets about the existence of the tunnel,
rendering it completely useless. Worse yet, because the
Americans didn’t know that the tunnel had been compromised
and continued to scarf up any tidbit of information they could
glean, the Russians were able to feed the US sleuths misleading
information through the tunnel. Eventually, the FBI had little
choice but to fill in the tunnel at a cost in the millions of
dollars.cxxii
While secret keepers never go into detail about past and future
damages in cases of unauthorized disclosures, media discussions and
speculations often force their hand. Illustrative of this situation is the
response given by the Cabinet Office to questions about the impact of
Snowden’s disclosures:
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It is obviously not possible in an open statement to go into detail
about the real and serious damage already caused by the
disclosures based on Mr Snowden’s misappropriations, nor about
what further damage may follow. However, given the volume of
media reporting published over the past three months, and
public statements from the UK and US Governments, I can say
with confidence that the material seized [by Snowden] is highly
likely to describe techniques that have been crucial in life-saving
counter-terrorism operations, the prevention and detection of
serious crime, and other intelligence activities vital to the
security of the UK. The compromise of these methods would do
serious damage to UK national security, and ultimately put lives
at risk.cxxiii
Secret keepers certainly know that history is giving them reasons to be
worried when the names of intelligence officers and sources are disclosed
without authorization, either through leakage or espionage.cxxiv On 23
December 1975, Richard S. Welch, the CIA station chief in Athens, was
assassinated on his doorstep by the terrorist group Revolutionary
Organization of November 17. His assassination was the result of a leak that
led to the adoption in 1982 of the Intelligence Identities Protection Act (Pub
L 97-200) (IIPA).cxxv In a pre-9/11 context, CIA officer Aldrich Ames’s
espionage on behalf of Russia resulted in the executions of at least ten
intelligence sources of the FBI and CIA and the imprisonment of others,
while the espionage on behalf of Russia of FBI officer Robert Hanssen
resulted in the death of at least two intelligence sources.cxxvi While both
Ames and Hanssen were not charged under the IIPA due to the severity of
their crimes, the IIPA has been used twice, both times leading to convictions
pursuant to guilty pleas. In the first instance dating to the 1980s, a CIA
source was believed to have been killed when a CIA clerk gave classified
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information to a Ghanaian agent she was romantically involved with.cxxvii In
the second instance a few years ago, a CIA officer gave the name of a covert
agent to a journalist, but no loss of life resulted from the unauthorized
disclosure.cxxviii
In testimony to Congress in 2012, Ken Wainstein, protected secrets as
a FBI officer and Assistant Attorney General for National Security, cited the
Welch’s death to illustrate the point that leaks cause harm to life:
Obviously, leaks can also prove dangerous or fatal to our [US
government] personnel in sensitive positions, as was tragically
demonstrated by the murder of the CIA’s Chief of Station in
Athens by terrorists in the 1970’s after his outing by a former
CIA employee.cxxix

Arguing by Analogy
The use of analogies in discourses as a “method of argumentation in
the social and political arena” is pervasive.cxxx As a mental tool that assists
reasoning, analogies help make sense of the world by making the unfamiliar
known.cxxxi Analogies do this by comparing one thing with something else
when there are components, or relationships between these components, in
both that play comparable roles, irrespective of each’s knowledge
domain.cxxxii What analogies do can be instructive, but also manipulative in
favour of their users’ ends.cxxxiii This is particularly so when they are used as
a problem solving tool, whereby they offer a “top-down mechanism for
constructing mental models.”cxxxiv As Holland and his colleagues explain,
In the case of problem solving, analogy is used to generate new
rules applicable to a novel target problem by transferring
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knowledge from a source domain that is better understood. The
usefulness of an analogy depends on the recognition and
exploitation of some significant similarity between the target and
the source.cxxxv
Secret keepers use an inter-domain analogy, which they refer to as
the mosaic theory or effect, terms that are used interchangeably as an
argument to protect state secrets from disclosure. Secret keepers use the
everyday life knowledge that people have about solving traditional
jigsaw/picture puzzles and apply it to state secrecy where each individual
secret being a piece of the puzzle. In doing so, secret keepers want judges
and the general public to understand the possible harmful effects that the
release of innocuous state secrets, individually or grouped together, could
cause. The analogy works because it can arguably stand on its own due its
simplicity and widespread understanding, but also because it is rooted in the
experience and knowledge of secret keepers, which gives them the authority
to determine what state secrets fall under the analogy.cxxxvi The mosaic
theory thus “holds that the executive branch is best qualified to ascertain
the importance of discrete bits of information as part of ‘the whole picture’ in
matters of national security.”cxxxvii Specifically, the theory posits that
Disparate items of information, though individually of limited or
no utility to their possessor, can take on added significance
when combined with other items of information. Combining the
items illuminates their interrelationships and breeds analytic
synergies, so that the resulting mosaic of information is worth
more than the sum of its parts. In the context of national
security, the mosaic theory suggests the potential for an
adversary to deduce from independently innocuous facts a
strategic vulnerability, exploitable for malevolent ends. […] The
relevant pieces of information might come from the government,
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other public sources, the adversary’s own sources, or any
mixture thereof.cxxxviii
The mosaic theory is commonly asserted in the United States and the
United Kingdom, typically in legal disputes regarding access to information
request. Secret keepers in the United States are particularly fond of the
mosaic effect. They have described it as a reconstituted jigsaw puzzle that
give a complete picture of a state secret that must be protected:
Minor details of intelligence information may reveal more
information than their apparent insignificance suggests because,
much like a piece of jigsaw puzzle, [each detail] may aid in
piecing together other bits of information even when the
individual piece is not of obvious importance in itself.cxxxix
Former senior CIA and FBI officer Philip Mudd made this point as
follow:
On the surface and in isolation, some of the information we
collected might be viewed as minutiae, bits of data collected for
their own sake. This judgment misses the crux of the
intelligence work we did: the fragment of a name from a training
camp years ago, matched with other data, might yield the
beginnings of an identification of that individual. In the world of
intelligence, this is gold.cxl
In order to fully avoid the mosaic effect, before the court the CIA
stressed that indirect references to sources and methods should be
protected from disclosure. After all, adversaries of the United States
have the capacity and ability to gather information from myriad
sources, analyze it, and deduce means and methods from
disparate details to defeat the CIA’s collection efforts [a
reference to loss of efficiency]. [...] Thus, even seemingly
innocuous, indirect references to an intelligence source or
method could have significant adverse effects when juxtaposed
with other publicly-available data.cxli
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In a declaration submitted in the course of a FOIA civil action, the FBI
used the mosaic argument to prevent the release of file numbers and subfile
names:
Applying a mosaic analysis, suspects could use these numbers
(indicative of investigative priority), in conjunction with other
information known about other individuals and/or techniques, to
change their pattern of activity to avoid detection, apprehension,
or create alibis for suspected activities, etc [a reference to loss
of efficiency].cxlii
And to prevent that the identity and/or location of FBI units be released:
The FBI asserted exemption (b)(7)(E)-4 to protect methods and
techniques involving the location and identity of FBI units and/or
joint units that were involved in this investigation. The office
location and units are usually found in the administrative
headings of internal FBI documents. These headings identify the
locations of the office and unit that originated or received the
documents. Disclosure of the location of the units conducting the
investigation would reveal the targets, the physical areas of
interest of the investigation, and when taken together with the
other locations if identified, could establish a pattern or ‘mosaic’
that identification of a single location would not. If the locations
are clusters in a particular area, it would allow hostile analysts
to avoid or circumvent those locations, especially if one or more
location appeared with frequency or in a pattern [a reference to
loss of efficiency]. This would disrupt the method of the
investigative process and deprive the FBI of valuable information
[a reference to loss of efficiency]. The withholding of the units
involved is justifiable as well under a similar rationale.cxliii
The United Kingdom used the mosaic argument several times over the
years.cxliv In the highly publicized Spycatcher case, it made the argument as
follows:
The dangers could arise notwithstanding that the information
disclosed was unclassified and is on its face and in isolation
apparently innocuous. Such information may take on a wider
significance if put together with other information in possession
of other persons and thereby, for example, enable them to
check the veracity of their sources of information. Furthermore,
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information which appears to be innocuous at a particular date
or to a particular officer may at a later date become
significant.cxlv
The line of argument developed in Spycatcher remains valid. In 2007,
the Director of Information (Exploitation) at the British Ministry of Defence
asserted in an access to information case that the government had “an
active concern about what he called the ‘mosaic effect,’ e.g., the risk that
pieces of information released in different contexts could be joined together
in order to build up a larger picture.”cxlvi In 2014, the Cabinet Office argued
in favour of the mosaic effect too, this time dismissing the notion that a
journalist could pass judgment on this argument:
Indeed it is impossible for a journalist alone to form a proper
judgment about what disclosure of protectively marked
intelligence does or does not damage national security... The
fragmentary nature of intelligence means that even a seemingly
innocuous piece of information can provide important clues to
individuals involved in extremism or terrorism.cxlvii
Conclusion
The rhetorical devices discussed in this article are parts and parcels of
the discourse of secret keepers, which give meaning to the social world of
state secrecy. Taken together, they form a linguistic practice that is
reproduced from one case to another, from one generation of secret keepers
to another. More importantly, these devices provide secret keepers means
by which to assert their knowledge and expertise, and to legitimize (if judges
use these devices to decide against disclosurecxlviii) the nondisclosure of state
secrets. By using arguments from ignorance and authority, secret keepers
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claim to secure a monopoly of knowledge, which has the effect of
establishing a sharp divide between sacred and profane knowledge and of
constituting others as profane.cxlix
The use of subjunctive conditionals has at least two major effects:
first, they are used for a clear moral purpose, that is, to avoid harm.
Second, they purport to reflect how the actual world of state secrecy was, is
or will be “causally hooked up.”cl Claiming future harm, for instance,
manufactures fear (ultimately, you see, someone could die) and raises the
first duty of the state, which should not be interfered with but honoured by
the court. In the end, the linguistic devices used by secret keepers are
means by which they can manage their credibility while convincing others
(judges and the public) of the necessity of sharing their viewpoint and
proposed course of action on nondisclosure.cli The claim of future harm is
central to the argument from consequences.
When arguing from consequences, secret keepers use verbs and
adjectives evoking fear and emotions and the loss of national security
protection effectiveness to claim that harm can be avoided and everyone
kept safe by the nondisclosure of state secrets. To that effect, secret
keepers have used value-oriented lexical terms such as “jeopardy,”
“disaster,” “risk,” “protection,” “stake,” “threat,” “harmful,” “damages,”
“endanger,” “safe,” “blood,” “killed,” “destroyed,” “countless,” “death,”
“incarceration,” “loss,” “lives,” “families,” “national security,” “arrest,”
“arrested,” “tortured,” “execution,” “harassment,” “harassed,” “important,”

https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/secrecyandsociety/vol2/iss2/6
DOI: 10.31979/2377-6188.2021.020206

42

Lefebvre: The Rhetorical Devices of the Keepers of State Secrets
“sacrosanct,” “sacred,” “survive,” “dry up,” “blow,” “deter,” “compromising,”
“useless,” “life-saving,” “assurance,” “assistance,” “expose,” “usefulness,”
“prejudice,” “affect,” “dangerous” and “fatal,” and qualifiers such as “great
deal,” “grave,” “serious,” “huge,” “very,” “crucial,” “vital,” “tremendous,”
“worst,” “real” and “extraordinarily.” The emotional and fear value of the
terms used is usually greater outside the court that within, as we have seen
in the examples on the reactions to Manning’s and Snowden’s disclosures,
where affidavits and testimonies by secret keepers and their legal
representatives are more measured and adjusted to respect the decorum
and rules of the court.clii Finally, to impress on their listeners how important
it is not to release what appears to be innocuous states secrets, secret
keepers resort to a basic inter-domain analogy, the mosaic theory, that can
be understood by just about anyone. Once again, the primary purpose of
using this analogy is to show judges and the general public that the
disclosure, in this case of apparently innocuous state secrets, could lead to
harmful consequences.
In the manner in which they are used, rhetorical devices have an
indeterminate temporal and spatial element. The harmful consequences that
could result from the disclosure of state secrets could be imminent or far off
into the future. Spatially, these harmful consequences could be felt very
close at home or in a far distant location. In other words: if not now, then
tomorrow; if not here, then over there. Ultimately, the possibility of harmful
consequences is always going to be contingent and indeterminate. For secret
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keepers, there is only one course of action open in such a circumstance: do
not disclose.
Rhetorical devices have by design a truth production component about
the effects of disclosing state secrets and a prescriptive component about
what to do with them. Secret keepers expect these effects and prescription
of nondisclosure to be acceptable to judges and the public under certain
conditions: when they represent the official position of the state, when the
official position of the state has a recognized status before the court and
before the public, and when the representatives of the states speak with
authority and within the confines of their recognized responsibilities.
Ultimately, “[I]t matters what one says and how one says it, […] the power
of words is both in their message and their form.”cliii
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